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Navigating Some Deep and Troubled Jurisprudential Waters:
Lawyer-Expert Witnesses and the Twin Dangers of
Disguised Testimony and Disguised Advocacy
Abstract. Expert testimony is indispensable to the uniquely American
system of adversary justice. Without the assistance of expert witnesses with
specialized knowledge, based on either science or experience and practice, jury
verdicts would often be the result of pure whim and prejudice, or random and
arbitrary decision-making. At the same time, the use of compensated, partisan
expert witnesses poses significant dangers to the fair and just determination of
disputes. This Article examines the enhanced dangers that can appear when
the expert witness is a lawyer, chiefly the pervasive use of "disguised
testimony" and "disguised advocacy." The Article concludes with some
suggestions for reform to minimize or eliminate these problems.
Author. W. William Hodes, an honors graduate of Harvard College (1966)
and Rutgers Law School (1969), is Professor Emeritus of Law at Indiana
University, where he taught for twenty years before retiring to establish his
current solo practice. Professor Hodes chiefly provides representation,
consultation, expert testimony, legal opinions, and other counsel and
assistance to other lawyers in areas of law, such as the law of lawyering,
constitutional, appellate, Supreme Court, and other complex litigation.
While on sabbatical leave during the October 1996 term of the Supreme
Court, Professor Hodes clerked for Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who had
been one of his law professors. He is a co-author (with Geoffrey C. Hazard,
Jr. and Peter R. Jarvis) of The Law ofLanyering, a nationally recognized treatise
on legal ethics that has been updated annually since the first edition was
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I. EXPERT TESTIMONY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM
Sitting down to write about the now-common occurrence of lawyers
serving as testifying expert witnesses (especially in legal malpractice
cases'), I encountered three difficult choices: where to begin, where to
1. Attorney malpractice litigation effectively requires the use of expert testimony by lawyers in
most cases. David S. Caudill, The Roles of Attornys as Courtroom Experts: Revisiting the Conventional
Limitaions and Their Exceptions, 2 ST. MARY'S J. LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 136, 158 (2012) (first citing
Streber v. Hunter, 221 F.3d 701, 724 (5th Cir. 2000); then citing Geiserman v. MacDonald, 893 F.2d
787, 793 (5th Cir. 1990); and then citing Wilburn Brewer, Jr., Expert Witness Testimony in Legal
Mapractice Cases, 45 S.C. L. REv. 727, 728 (1994)). The exceptions arise when the defendant's
malpractice is so obvious that lay jurors would not need the assistance of an expert witness to
appreciate it-the most common example being failing to file suit within the applicable statute of
limitations. 4 RONALD E. MALLEN, LEGAL MALPRACTICE S 37:127, at 1786-1802 (2016 ed.). While
there is "no bright-line test to determine when expert testimony is required" in legal malpractice
cases, "[e]xpert testimony can be unnecessary when.... [The defendant-lawyer 'is so grossly
ineffective that his lack of professionalism is plain to see."' Caudill, supra, at 160 (first quoting
Wilburn Brewer, Jr., Expert Witness Testimony in LegalMalpractice Cases, 45 S.C. L. REV. 727, 739 (1994);
and then quoting Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 220 (1st Cit. 1987)). For example, "clearly
defrauding a client[,] ignoring the client's requests and failing to do minimal discovery[,] failing to
keep a client informed regarding the need for independent counsel in a conflict situation[] and failing
to provide a termite report in a residential real estate transaction" represent cases where the
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end, and how much to cover in between. I concluded that to explain the
fundamental jurisprudential difficulties inevitably implicated by the use of
lawyer-experts, I had to start with expert testimony generally.
When used properly and according to the rules, expert witnesses
streamline the litigation process and make accurate and just outcomes
more likely. Each of the other key actors in the courtroom drama-
advocates, judges, jurors, and lay witnesses-can better perform their
assigned roles.
But if expert witnesses abuse the system by exceeding the boundaries of
proper expert testimony,2 the result is a jurisprudential mess. The line
between sound opinion and speculation becomes blurred, assumptions
and facts conflate,3 and the distinction between observation and hearsay is
lost.' Too often, moreover, these excesses are encouraged by the lawyers
presenting the testimony of the experts,' thus calling into question, in yet
another setting, the limits of adversary zeal.
All of these problems spill over into cases in which the expert witness is
a lawyer but in more troubling variations that play havoc with baseline
principles of the adversary system. In particular, there is the further
danger that lawyer-experts will obscure the jurisprudentially critical line
between law and fact by not only interfering with the fact-finding function
of the jury but also trenching upon the court's prerogative to say what law
defendant-lawyer's negligence was obvious, thereby negating the need for special learning to evaluate
the defendant's conduct. Id. (footnotes omitted). There are few situations, other than opinion
testimony on a "pure" question of law, in which expert testimony is prohibited altogether, but exactly
what the lawyer-expert will be permitted to say on the witness stand and how are frequently
contested issues that form much of the subject matter of this Article.
2. See David S. Caudill, Contmerial Defenses to Legal Ma4ractice Claims: Are Attorny-Experts Being
Asked to Be Advocates?, 5 ST. MARY'S J. LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 312, 316 n.9 (2015) (acknowledging
the possibility that experts in any field can encroach upon the judge's province by testifying as to the
relevant law or upon the jury's role in finding the facts of the case).
3. See Clark v. Takata Corp., 192 F.3d 750, 757 (7th Cit. 1999) (refusing to admit expert
testimony when the expert assumed a fact necessary to his opinion because there was no independent
evidence of that fact).
4. Compare FED. R. EVID. 802 ("Hearsay is not admissible unless . . . other rules prescribed by
the Supreme Court [provide otherwise].'), aith id. R. 703 ("An expert may base an opinion on facts
or data in the case that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed. If experts in the
particular field would reasonably rely on [the same] kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on
the subject, they need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted.'. As explained in Part I.D.
of this Article, however, Rule 703 does not presage the wholesale abandonment of the hearsay rule
merely because an expert witness has taken the stand.
5. Charles W. Ehrhardt, The Conflict Concerning Expert Witnesses and Legal Conclusions, 92 W. VA. L.
REV. 645, 645 (1990) (recognizing the attempt by trial lawyers to broaden the traditional limits
"placed on the scope of opinion testimony").
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will govern resolution of the dispute.
A. Relevance and Reliability
The critical threshold question is why experts in any field are permitted
to testify in any case. They typically have zero first-hand contemporaneous
knowledge about the facts.' Then, what is the point of squandering
precious court time on their testimony? How can expert testimony even
be relevant?
The standard answer, given by Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 7028
and its state counterparts in the thirty-five or so jurisdictions that follow
the federal practice,' is that experts, such as physicians,'o architects,"
engineers,12 accountants," lab technicians," and rodeo cowboys,1 5 may
state their opinions about the significance of facts-usually developed by
6. See Caudill, supra note 1, at 152 (contending legal expert opinions create a danger that the jury
may look to the expert for an explanation of the legal principles governing the case rather than the
trial judge's instructions).
7. See United States v. Smith, 519 F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1975) (endorsing expert witnesses'
reliance on facts of which they have no personal knowledge).
8. FED. R. EvID. R. 702.
9. See Uniforn Rules of.Etidence, CORNELL U. L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/uniform/
evidence (last visited May 5, 2016) (identifying thirty-eight states that have adopted the Uniform
Rules of Evidence, which are very similar to the Federal Rules of Evidence).
10. See Cornejo v. Hilgers, 446 S.W. 3d 113, 122-23 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet.
denied) (holding an obstetrician had the requisite education, experience, and familiarity with the
subject matter to testify on the probable causes of "hypoxic-ischemic injuries in babies').
11. See Bourgeois v. Arrow Fence Co., 592 So. 2d 445, 449 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (permitting a
licensed architect and licensed builder who had extensive construction experience to testify as an
expert in a design defect case involving the construction of a patio).
12. See Gholar v. A 0 Safety, 39 F. Supp. 3d 856, 860 (S.D. Miss. 2014) (refusing to allow the
expert testimony of an engineer with a bachelor's degree in mechanical engineering and experience in
safety engineering but no experience in the field of safety goggles manufacturing or design because
his testimony would not assist the jury in a products liability claim against a safety goggles
manufacturer).
13. See Wechsler v. Hunt Health Sys., Ltd., 381 F. Supp. 2d 135, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(admitting an accountant as qualified to testify based on his "[seventeen] years of experience
reviewing financial documents").
14. See State ex rL Dep't of Health & Human Res. v. Rice, 482 So. 2d 873, 875-76
(La. Ct. App. 1986) (allowing a witness to testify as an expert in paternity testing when he held a
masters' degree in microbiology, had on-the-job training at a crime lab, and attended classes related
to paternity testing).
15. See Pena v. Partridge, No. 13-95-119-CV, 1997 WL 33760708, at *4 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi, Feb. 20, 1997, no pet.) (not designated for publication) ("Appellant's expert witness, Warren
Evans, based his opinions on his general experience at numerous rodeos throughout the state, as well
as his observations of the Sheriffs Posse arena, and depositions of the parties."). The case involved
an amateur rodeo rider who was injured when her horse collided with another rider's horse as she
exited the arena at speed into an adjacent alleyway. Id. at *1.
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others'6-but only if the expert's "specialized knowledge" will "help" the
jury" "to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."' Far
from being irrelevant or of dubious value, expert testimony-properly
cabined-is actually essential to the fair and just operation of the American
dispute resolution system in both civil and criminal matters.
The American system, unlike any other in the world, routinely assigns to
lay jurors the task of deciding contested questions of fact that they cannot
comprehend, let alone decide intelligibly." If that is not enough, the same
laymen must then meld the facts they have found into a verdict consistent
with a complex web of legal principles given to them in instructions from
the trial judge,20 the nuances of which they can barely appreciate.
On the one hand, without the help of experts who have been down
these roads before and have gained specialized knowledge, either as a
matter of scientific inquiry or through personal knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, jurors would have no way of coming to
sound decisions about the facts or the follow-on legal conclusions. They
could only fall back on guesswork, whim, arbitrariness, sympathy, and
ultimately prejudice. On the other hand, ensuring expert witnesses, and
the lawyers presenting their testimony, do not provide illegitimate help to
jurors-such as by cowing awestruck jurors into giving expert opinions
more weight than they deserve-is also an indispensable feature of the
American adversary system and of adversary ethics.
Both the permissive and the limiting aspects of the rule allowing expert
opinion testimony have been fleshed out in a large body of subsidiary
rules, practices, and procedures; all of which are connected, at least in part,
to the seminal Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaeuticals, Inc.2 1 and its abundant
progeny. Daubed confirmed that the touchstone of admissibility is
16. See FED. R. EvID. 703 advisory committee's note (1972 proposed rules) (contemplating
expert opinions may be based on facts and data presented outside of the courtroom and other than
by personal perception and observation).
17. The rule speaks of "the trier of fact" rather than "the jury" to govern expert testimony in
bench trials as well. Id. R. 702(a). However, the problems attending expert testimony by lawyers or
non-lawyers during bench trials are comparatively benign and can be safely ignored for purposes of
this Article.
18. Id.
19. See id. advisory committee's note (1972 proposed rules) ("An intelligent evaluation of facts
is often difficult or impossible without the application of some scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge.'").
20. Ehrhardt, supra note 5, at 673 ("It is the judge's function to determine the applicable law
and instruct the jury upon it; it is the jury's function to consider the evidence, to find the facts and to
apply the law as received from the trial judge.'").
21. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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whether proffered expert testimony would indeed help the jury go about
its work and established a largely hospitable atmosphere by taking a
generous view of what is "helpful."" But the Court also constituted, trial
court judges as "gatekeepers" who must exclude expert testimony that
would not be helpful or would actually make it more difficult for jurors to
understand the issues and decide them on a permissible, non-arbitrary
basis.23
Under Daubert and the most important follow-on case, Kumbo Tire Co. v.
Carmichael,` helpfulness (and thus admissibility) is determined chiefly by
whether the proffered opinions are relevant to the specific factual dispute
involved25 and reliable in that they are grounded in sufficient facts or data
and are based on sound scientific methodology or other expert analysis
that is something more than speculation and diktat.2 6
22. See id. at 591-92 (defining helpful testimony as testimony providing the trier of fact with
knowledge that will assist in evaluating relevant facts of the case). Oddly, in some jurisdictions,
opposition to the Daubert standard comes chiefly from plaintiffs' lawyers, who assert that it makes
expert testimony--especially scientific expert testimony-less welcome in the courts and harder to
introduce into evidence. This is odd because in Daubert, the testimony that was allowed would have
been excluded by Frye v. United States, which Daubert replaced. See id. at 589, 593 (replacing Fye's
general-acceptance test for admitting expert scientific testimony with a non-exhaustive list of
observations for admitting expert scientific testimony).
23. See id. at 593-95 (providing a non-exhaustive list of "observations" appropriate for
determining whether the reasoning or methodology that underlies the expert testimony is
scientifically valid and relevant to the facts of the case).
24. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). The main contribution of Kumbo Tire
was to clarify that the helpful-to-the-jury, specialized knowledge contemplated by FRE 702 was not
limited to the hard sciences but included expertise gained from personal knowledge, practice, or
experience (that would not be familiar to the typical juror). Id. at 147. Such expert testimony would
continue to be admissible-for whatever weight the jury chose to give it-so long as the proffered
opinions were solidly grounded and helpful in resolving the disputed factual issues in the case at
hand. See id. at 152 (reiterating the importance of Dauberts gatekeeping requirement as a means of
ensuring the proffered expert testimony is reliable and relevant). Some lawyers did not immediately
appreciate Dauberts focus on the reliability of the "principles and methods" employed by the expert
who had no particular applicability to testimony not derived from scientific inquiry. As a former law
professor specializing in legal ethics, the author was once asked at a deposition what "methods" he
had followed in reaching his opinions in a complex case involving conflicts of interest and breach of
fiduciary duty. The author's bemused response: "I read a lot, I talk to people, and then I think about
it a lot."
25. The Daubert Court stated expert opinions not relating to an issue in the case could not be
helpful to the jury and, thus, were, by definition, not relevant. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591. In addition,
proffered opinions must fit the specific to be truly helpful and, thus, relevant. Id. As an example, the
Court stated that an expert who studied the phases of the moon might have opinions that fit a case in
which the issue was whether a certain night was dark but would have nothing helpful to contribute if
the issue was whether a certain person acted irrationally because the moon was full on that night. Id.
26. See Kumbo Tire, 526 U.S. at 152 (reiterating the importance of the gatekeeping role of judges
described in Daubers to ensure the proffered expert testimony is reliable and relevant). A witness can
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Significantly, this does not mean the trial court will hold a preliminary
hearing and admit only the expert opinions that are more nearly correct.
Judges themselves typically do not have the expertise to make such a call,
and in any event, it is ultimately up to the jury to determine which of
several competing relevant, reliable (and therefore admissible) expert
opinions are most credible and, thus, most helpful."
B. Expert Testimony About an "Ul.imate Issue"
The broad scope of permissible expert testimony is further
demonstrated by FRE 704(a), which states: "An opinion is not
objectionablejust because it embraces an ultimate issue."" In other words,
although an expert need not proffer an opinion that includes the expert's
own view about how an ultimate issue ought to be decided (by the jury),
such testimony is not automatically barred and will often be admissible.
But there are limits to the ultimate issue rule as well; Rule 704 does not
trump the other rules of evidence and permit unsupported and conclusory
opinion testimony. The vice of such testimony is not, as is sometimes said,
that it would inevitably "usurp[] the province of the jury"" because a
be a thoroughgoing "expert" in a field but still not have anything "reliable" to contribute to a
particular case. In Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., for example, the issue was whether the use for a few days
and immediate discontinuation of a stop-smoking nicotine patch had "caused" a patient's heart
attack. Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 317-18 (7th Cit. 1996). One of the plaintiffs expert
witnesses was a renowned cardiologist, but his testimony was excluded because he had no particular
knowledge about the effects of nicotine patches on the progress of heart disease, let alone short-term
use. Id. at 319-20. Affirming the exclusion, Judge Posner tartly noted, "[A] district judge asked to
admit scientific evidence must determine whether the evidence is genuinely scientific, as distinct from
being unscientific speculation offered by a genuine scientist." Id. at 318. Subsequently, the same
court noted in another case that even "[a] supremely qualified expert cannot waltz into the
courtroom and render opinions unless those opinions are based upon some recognized scientific
method." Clark v. Takata Corp., 192 F.3d 750, 759 n.5 (7th Cir. 1999). After Kumbo Tire, of course,
an expert opinion need not be based on strictly "scientific" methods. See id. at 759 n.4 (referencing a
non-scientific method relied on by defendants' expert). However, it is still the case that an expert
cannot "waltz" into court and espouse unsupported opinions and conclusions.
27. In Smith v. Ford Motor Co. the court noted,
The question of whether the expert is credible or whether his of her theories are correct given
the circumstances of a particular case is a factual one that is left for the jury to determine after
opposing counsel has been provided the opportunity to cross-examine the xpert regarding his
conclusions and the facts on which they are based.
Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 713, 719 (7th Cit. 2000) (citing Walker v. Soo Line R.R., 208 F.3d
581, 589-90 (7th Cir. 2000)); see id. ("It is not the trial court's role to decide whether an expert's
opinion is correct. The trial court is limited to determining whether expert testimony is pertinent to
an issue in the case and whether the methodology underlying that testimony is sound.").
28. FED. R. EVID. 704(a) (emphasis added).
29. Id. R. 704 advisory committee's note (1972 proposed rules).
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properly instructed and conscientious jury will perform its function the
same way, whether or not the expert is providing opinions on ultimate
issues. The jury's function could only be "usurped" if the jurors agree to
cede their decision-making authority to the expert and slavishly follow
whatever the expert says (perhaps because the expert is impressive or
imposing or has good communication skills). But that would be an
unacceptable systemic breakdown no matter the kind of opinions the
expert witness gives.
The chief reason unsupported and unexplained expert testimony about
an ultimate issue is inadmissible is that it has no legitimate capacity to "help
the trier of fact";`o thus, it is inadmissible under Rule 702."2 Indeed, this
kind of testimony will either further confuse the jury or cause it to shirk its
independent duty to weigh all of the evidence, as described immediately
above.
But even recognizing the continuing force of the limitations on expert
testimony mandated by FRE 702 as glossed by the Daubert line of cases,
the permission granted by FRE 704(a) to admit ultimate issue opinions is
significant. For example, an expert witness may opine that the driver in an
automobile crash case was intoxicated at the time of the accident,3 2 that
the car driven by the defendant was travelling in excess of the speed limit
at the time of the accident,3 3 that the value of property lost by an insured
30. Id. R. 702(a).
31. In Kumbo Tire, the Supreme Court said:
The objective of [the gatekeeping] requirement is to ensure the reliability and relevancy of
expert testimony. It is to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon
professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual
ngor that characteries the practice of an expert in the relevantfield.
Kumbo Tire, 526 U.S. at 152 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Mid-State Fertiliter Co. v. Exchange National
Bank of Chicago, a case that preceded Daubert and Kumho Tire but is consistent with both, the court
evaluated the testimony of an academic expert by the same standard:
[A]n expert who supplies nothing but a bottom line supplies nothing of value to the judicial
process.... [The expert] would not accept from his students or those who submit papers to his
journal an essay containing neither facts nor reasons; why should a court rely on the sort of
exposition the scholar would not tolerate in his professional life?
Mid-State Fertilizer Co. v. Exch. Nat'l Bank of Chi., 877 F.2d 1333, 1339 (7th Cit. 1989).
32. Seegeneraly Northside Equities, Inc. v. Hulsey, 567 S.E.2d 4 (Ga. 2002) (acknowledging, in a
Dram Shop Act case, that expert testimony regarding the manifestations of intoxication in a person
with the driver's blood alcohol level was sufficient to preclude summary judgment in favor of the
tavern, despite eye witness testimony that the driver was not noticeably intoxicated when she left the
premises).
33. See generally Burtner v. Lafayette Par. Consol. Gov't, 2014-1180 (La. App. 3 Cir. 4/15/15);
176 So. 3d 1056 (noting an accident reconstruction expert's testimony, that a police officer returning
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in a fire exceeded a certain amount,34 and that it was not necessary to
perform an abortion to save the life of the mother." Indeed, a properly
qualified expert should be permitted to testify as to his opinion that the
driver negligently caused the accident36-or, looking ahead to legal
malpractice cases where the expert is a lawyer that testifies "in providing
legal services to the client, the defendant[-]lawyer fell below the standard
of care."37
In each case, however, the opinion will be inadmissible unless it is
supported by more than mere fiat or self-validating appeals to the witness's
scientific or other expertise. To satisfy the gatekeeping judge under
Daubert and Kumho Tire, the expert must supply sufficient explanation and
reasoning to make the testimony "reliable."38
In the above examples of permissible expert testimony, the crucial
operative words are "opine" and "opinion"; without them, the nice
jurisprudential balance established for expert testimony would be
destroyed. The only reason the expert is not "usurping the province of the
to the police station to use the restroom was traveling at least fifteen miles per hour above the speed
limit at the time of the accident, required adjustment on appeal of comparative fault percentages).
Accident reconstruction experts have testified that a criminal defendant charged with causing an
accident by exceeding the speed limit in thousands of cases nationwide.
34. See generally McGuire v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 175 So. 2d 838 (La. Ct. App. 1965)
(asserting the value of a stamp collection lost in a fire could not be found to be greater than the cost
of the individual stamps absent expert testimony).
35. In People v. Wilson, a physician was prosecuted for performing an abortion and a later
physician who examined the patient was allowed to give his expert opinion and state he "found no
evidence that a therapeutic abortion was necessary." People v. Wilson, 153 P.2d 720, 724 (1944).
Obviously, this case long predated Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
36. See generally Dakter v. Cavallino, 2014 WI App 112, 358 Wis. 2d 434, 856 N.W.2d 523
(permitting experts, including a retired instructor in a truck driver training program, to opine that the
truck driver involved in an accident with an automobile turning in front of him was negligent, even
though the driver was not exceeding the posted speed limit and had the right of way).
37. In Ronald E. Mallen, Legal Malpracice, the author cites hundreds of cases directly or
inferentially supporting this proposition. 4 MALLEN, supra note 1, §§ 37:120-37:123, at 1762-78; see
also id. § 37:120, at 1763 ("Expert testimony is used as the evidence to establish the standard of care
or standard of conduct by which the defendant's conduct is to be judged. ... [And] is necessary to
show a breach of the appropriate standard."). As will be seen later in this Article, infra Parts II.A and
II.B., the author has at least a semantical difference with Mallen about whether experts can and do
help "establish" the standard of care with their testimony. Everyone agrees, however, that lawyer-
experts routinely provide opinion testimony under oath about whether the standard has been breached.
38. FRE 705 states, in part, that "an expert may state an opinion-and give the reasons for it-
without first testifying to the underlying facts or data" and further provides that the expert may be
required to provide the missing detailed data on cross-examination. FED. R. EVID 705. This merely
means that a scientific expert is not required (on direct examination) to provide specific testing data and
that an expert with specialized knowledge or practical experience is not required to lay out in detail
the facts assumed to be true. But, as noted in the text, the reasoning must still be given because
otherwise the opinions would be of no (legitimate) help to the jury.
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jury," is that he is only swearing under oath that he genuinely holds the
opinions or conclusions in question. Furthermore, even that testimony is
conditional: it holds only f all of the underlying facts "check out."" Most
important, the expert will not be the one to "check out" the correctness of
those facts-that function belongs to the jury alone. Once the jury has
determined what the underlying facts actually are, the jury can then-and
only then-move on to deciding whether the expert's opinions are sound
and more worthy of belief than another expert's contrary conclusions.
C. Expert Witnesses Assume Everything but 'Know" Nothing
The most confidently stated expert opinion, whether about the ultimate
issue or any other, is only sound if the opinion fits or makes sense of the
underlying facts. As intimated immediately above in Part I.B., a critical
problem affecting almost all expert testimony is that expert witnesses, by
definition, cannot testify about the existence or non-existence of those
facts. Except for rare situations in which an expert witness was also a
percipient witness to the events giving rise to the lawsuit, such as an
emergency room physician who observed what his colleagues did or did
not do, experts can only base their opinions on what they assume to be the
facts. They actually know nothing at all about the underlying facts, except
what others have told them or what others have said-in a deposition, for
example, or a police or other investigative report.
Even when an expert is testifying about the results of scientific tests that
he personally performed, such as DNA matching or earth core sampling to
detect the presence of toxic chemicals, he has no independent knowledge
about the origins of the material he tested. The sample was given to him
for testing by someone who received it from someone else; the expert can
only assume the sample came from where he was told. Even if the expert
dug the core sample out of the ground for testing himself, someone else
told him where to dig. And in either event, the expert has no independent
knowledge about what happened before the blood was spilled or how it
came to be spilled, or how the toxic chemicals got to the place they were
discovered and who was responsible for getting them there.
To put it bluntly, expert witnesses must base all of their opinions and
39. When an expert testifies that the value of property lost in a fire exceeded a certain amount,
as in one of the examples given above, the opinion must be understood to be qualified by a large
number of assumptions about the underlying facts-facts that will be supplied by others and
evaluated by the jury. A small sample would include (a) the property was in fact present at the time
of the fire; (b) the property was real and not fake; and (c) the descriptions and bills of sale for the
property were accurate and genuine.
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testimony on facts they assume to be true and facts they must further
assume the jury will later find to be true. Thus, all expert testimony has
appended to it an unstated footnote: If you ladies and gentlemen of the
jury find that the facts are otherwise, then my opinion would have to be
modified.40
Unfortunately, expert witnesses today commonly obscure this point
without directly denying it, often at the behest of the lawyers engaging
them. By focusing almost all of their attention on their opinions and soft-
pedaling the factual assumptions that necessarily underlie those opinions,
experts give the impression that the assumptions and the facts are one and
the same. But these are faux facts that, if repeated often enough, can
become common currency for everyone in the courtroom, including the
jury. If the jury willy-nilly accepts an expert's version of the facts without
making its own independent determination, its function has de facto been
usurped and one of the core features of the American adversary system
has been undone.
This kind of "disguised testimony" about the facts provides an
opportunity for the lawyer to use the expert's voice to project his side's
closing argument to the jury mid-trial (and to do it more than once if more
than one expert is presented). Although an expert-whether or not he is a
lawyer-is not an advocate, he is hardly a disinterested witness; he is on
the same team as the lawyer presenting his testimony.4 1 By using the
expert in this way, the lawyer who is an advocate gains an unfair advantage:
jurors who are properly impressed by the witness's expert knowledge and
professional manner may be unduly and improperly impressed by his
seeming command of the facts as well but not sufficiently on guard against
his built-in bias as a team player.
D. Experts Are Permitted to Rely on Hearsay in Formulating Their Opinions, but
May Not Serve as Mouthpieces, Spokesmen, or Parrots in Court
Disguised testimony about the facts, as described in Part I.C., is often
the most pernicious influence that experts bring into the courtroom, out-
signifying so-called "junk science,"42 which can be stopped at the
40. In the author's own practice as an expert witness, he inserts similar language into expert
reports that he files under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B) or its state court counterparts:
"Should the parties later agree that the facts are otherwise, a trier-of-fact find that they are otherwise,
or should it otherwise appear that my assumptions about the facts were incorrect, some of my
opinions might have to be revised, and I reserve the right.to do so."
41. See discussion infra discussion Part I.E.
42. See generally PETER W. HUBER, GAILEO'S REVENGE:JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM
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courthouse gate by the Daubert gatekeeper or nullified by hard cross-
examination. But FRE 703 appears, at first glance, to open the gate to
much testimony that would otherwise be inadmissible (especially on
hearsay grounds) as long as it forms the backdrop to expert testimony.
The rule provides that an expert witness "may base an opinion on facts
or data ... that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed,""
and if experts in the field "would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or
data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need not be admissible for the
opinion to be admitted."44
Read literally, this suggests a physician could repeat for the jury a
relative's statement that a patient had experienced stomach pain less than
two hours after ingesting the defendant's product or an accountant could
testify that he had based his opinion on the many conversations he had
with a party's bookkeeper. Without more-and especially if the relative or
the bookkeeper did not testify-these statements would be clear-cut
violations of the hearsay rule because the jury would have no way of
evaluating the underlying "facts" and the expert's testimony about the
facts would no longer be "disguised"; it would be out in the open and
unmistakable. At the same time, the expert's opinions would perforce
become unreliable because they would be based on nothing of substance.
Some of this difficulty was alleviated when FRE 703 was amended in
2000, building on case law that had been developing. A sentence was
added at the end of the rule that stated, in the case of otherwise
inadmissible facts or data, as in the above examples, "the proponent of the
opinion may disclose them to the jury only if their probative value in
helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs their
prejudicial effect."4 s The cases and the notes of the Advisory Committee
on Evidence Rules make clear that if inadmissible material is admitted by
way of explanation of an expert's opinion under Rule 703, the court is at a
minimum required to give a limiting instruction that directs the jury not to
consider the evidence for any substantive purpose.46
198-213 (1991) (decrying the use of junk science and providing insights on how to combat it).
43. FED. R. EvID 703 (emphasis added).
44. Id. (emphasis added).
45. Id. (emphasis added). This balancing test is similar to the balance required under Rule 403,
which states the probative value of concededly relevant evidence might be "substantially outweighed"
by "unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury," or other concerns. Id. R. 403.
46. See id. R. 703 advisory committee's note (2000 amendments) ("If the otherwise inadmissible
information is admitted under this balancing test [of amended Rule 703], the trial judge must give a
limiting instruction, upon request, informing the jury that the underlying information must not be used
for substantive purposes." (emphasis added)). The Advisory Committee's notes further state, "The
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As developed in the case law, the refinement of FRE 703, as originally
promulgated, has become a significant palliative to the worst forms of
disguised testimony by experts. An expert may still formulate an opinion
on the basis of hearsay or other inadmissible evidence, but he may be
prevented from testifying about that aspect of his opinion in court. More
important, if the underlying facts are not presented through the testimony
of other witnesses, the expert may not be permitted to testify at all because
his opinions may be found to have "rested on air"" and will, thus, lack
the reliability required by FRE 702 and the Daubert-Kumho Tire line of
cases.4 8
An excellent example was provided by Loeffel Steel Products, Inc. v. Delta
Brands, Inc." Loeffel alleged that Delta had sold it a defective line of
industrial equipment, resulting in economic damage and lost profits.so
The defendant proffered a financial expert who specialized in the appraisal
of private businesses as a damages expert; for present purposes, his chief
opinion was that Loeffel had suffered only small losses because by hiring a
few more workers and adding a few more shifts, it could achieve roughly
the same productivity it had before purchasing the Delta line of
equipment.
When it became apparent the expert had "uncritically relied" on
numbers provided by Delta's staff,s' including estimates of how long it
would take each new worker to perform the suddenly necessary additional
tasks, his testimony was excluded." The court said:
[W]hile Rule 703 was intended to liberalize the rules relating to expert
testimony, it was not intended to abolish the hearsay rule and to allow a
witness, under the guise of giving expert testimony, to in effect become the
amendment provides a presumption against disclosure to the jury of information used as the basis of
an expert's opinion and not admissible for any substantive purpose, when that information is offered
by the proponent of the expert." Id.; see also TK-7 Corp. v. Estate of Barbouti, 993 F.2d 722, 734 n.9
(10th Cit. 1993) ("When an expert relies on hearsay information to form an opinion, '[t]he hearsay is
admitted for the limited purpose of informing the jury of the basis of the expert's opinion and not
for proving the truth of the matter asserted."' (alteration in original) (quoting Wilson v. Merrell Dow
Pharms., Inc., 893 F.2d 1149,1153 (10th Cit. 1990))).
47. See Dura Auto. Sys. of Ind., Inc. v. CTS Corp., 285 F.3d 609, 615 (7th Cir. 2002) ("Without
their testimony explaining and justifying the discretionary choices that they made, his testimony
would have rested on air."). The Dura Automotive opinion was heavily relied upon by the court in
Loeffel Steel Prods., Inc. v. Delta Brand, Inc., which is discussed immediately below in the text.
48. See discussion supra Part I.A.
49. Loeffel Steel Prods., Inc. v. Delta Brands, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 2d 794 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
50. Id. at 798.
51. Id. at 807.
52. Id. at 808.
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mouthpiece of the witnesses on whose statements or opinions the expert
purports to base his opinion.
Rule 703 was never intended to allow oblique evasions of the hearsay
rule.
The problem [as in Dura Automotive Systems of Indiana, Inc. v. CTS
Corp.53 ], then, is that the expert is vouching for the truth of what another
expert told him-he is merely that expert's spokesman. But, "[a] scientist,
however well credentialed he may be, is not permitted to be the mouthpiece
of a scientist in a different specialty. That would not be responsible
science."5 4
Loeffel Steel relied on Dura Automotive throughout. In Dura Automoive, an
unquestioned expert in hydrogeology was engaged to give his opinion
about whether toxic chemicals from the defendant-company's
groundwater could have leached into the plaintiff-company's well field,
which resulted in EPA fines against Dura Automotive. His opinion
depended on whether CTS Corporation was in the same "well field
capture zone" as Dura Automotive or had been in the last twenty or more
years. To answer that preliminary question, he consulted computer
mapping experts using software of their choosing.
CTS Corporation, perhaps thinking FRE 703 would authorize its
hydrogeology expert to incorporate what he learned from the mapping
experts into his own testimony, neglected to designate the latter as
additional experts. Consequently-as intimated in the above quotation
from the Loeffel Steel-the hydrogeology expert was not allowed to testify
at all because he knew nothing about capture zones and nothing about
which software could look backwards twenty years to determine the
boundaries of a capture zone.
Affirming the trial court's exclusion order, the Seventh Circuit
acknowledged, in many routine situations, one expert may rely on the say-
so of another expert without more. But the situation is quite different,
Judge Richard Posner continued for the court, when the correctness of the
opinion of the expert who was relied on is at issue:
The Committee Notes to the 1972 Proposed Rule 703 give the example of a
53. Dura Auto. Sys. of Ind., Inc. v. CTS Corp., 285 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. 2002).
54. Loeffel Steel, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 808 (alteration in original) (footnote added) (quoting Dura
Automotive, 285 F.3d at 614).
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physician who, though not an expert in radiology, relies for a diagnosis on an
x-ray. We too do not "believe that the leader of a clinical medical team must
be qualified as an expert in every individual discipline encompassed by the
team in order to testify as to the team's conclusions." But suppose the
soundness of the underlying expert judgment is in issue. Suppose a thoracic
surgeon gave expert evidence in a medical malpractice case that the
plaintiffs decedent had died because the defendant, a radiologist, had
negligently failed to diagnose the decedent's lung cancer until it was too
advanced for surgery. The surgeon would be competent to testify that the
cancer was too advanced for surgery, but in offering the additional and critical
judgment that the radiologst should have discovered the cancer sooner he would
be, at best, just parroting the opinion of [anothed] expert in radiology competent to
testify that the defendant had x-rayed the decedent carelessly.5 5
Taken together, these and similar cases demonstrate what the author
refers to throughout this Article as disguised testimony (about the
underlying facts) continues to be frowned upon. Whether an expert is
referred to as a "mouthpiece," a "spokesman," or a "parrot" of another
expert or a lay witness, the point is the same: when the underlying facts are
contested, the jury must be able to hear from those with real knowledge
about those facts before it can turn to evaluating what the expert has to
say about their significance. 5 6
But this is another way of saying experts do not "know" much (about
55. Dura Automotive, 285 F.3d at 613 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). In a long and
thoughtful dissent, Judge Diane Wood complained that the majority's view of "parroting" would
result in an "infinite regression" of designated experts, because the second expert might well have
relied on a third expert, and so on. Id. at 618 (Wood, J., dissenting) ("Expert [One] may have relied
on something prepared using the expertise of Expert [Two], who in turn relied on the expertise of
Expert [Three], and on out until we reach Expert N."). In her view, the majority was not being
faithful to FRE 702 and the Daubert regime either, because all that was required of the computer
modelers was that they advise the main expert that their methodology was sound-the software they
were using was well-accepted and often used for exactly the kind of analysis they performed. See id
at 619 (stating "[nlothing in Daubert, any of the later Supreme Court decisions, or amended Rule 702
requires" what the majority posits). An important aspect ofJudge Wood's dissent, however, was that
the secondary experts should have been allowed to file late reports (and then presumably testify at
trial). This narrows the dispute between Judges Posner and Wood on the Rule 703 portion of the
case because, presumably, both would agree that ifthe computer modeling experts were permitted to
testify at the trial, the jury would be able to separately evaluate the two issues, and the parroting
problem would not arise.
56. If the evidence the expert is relying on might be admissible for some purpose other than
explaining the expert's opinions, the parroting problem will disappear, but on# ifthe underying endence is
actual# presented. If the evidence is admissible and is ultimately presented to the jury, it is not
important whether the evidence has been put before the jury at the time the expert testifies. The
proponent of the expert can assure the trial court that the underlying facts will be offered in
admissible form, and the testimony "tied up." Cf FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's note
(2000 amendments) (discussing the purposes and rationale behind the 2000 Amendments).
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the facts); they can only assume what others will testify to in court and what
the ju willfind to be true." Judge Posner argued against bootstrapping facts
into an expert's opinion in another often-cited case, In re James Wilson
Associatesa`
If, for example, the expert witness (call him A) bases his opinion in part on a
fact (call it X) that the pary's lanyer told him, the lawyer cannot, in closing
argument, tell the jury, "See we proved X through our expert witness, A." 5 9
This feature of expert testimony is more pronounced when the expert is a
lawyer."o That does not mean lawyers should not be permitted to testify
as experts, but only that special care should be taken to mitigate the
"parroting" effect or bootstrapping from what the advocate tells the expert
to assume into "proven" fact.
E. Expert Witnesses Are Not Advocates; nor, However, Are They Unbiased or
Disinterested
Expert testimony is neither unbiased nor disinterested." Experts will
only agree to analyze a stranger's case, prepare a report, or testify under
oath if they are paid for their time. Lawyers representing a client will only
spend the client's money or advance their own to designate a particular
expert if they are confident the expert's opinions will be helpful to the
client's cause. That means, if initial discussions with Expert A are not
promising, the lawyer will move on to Expert B or C.
Thus, although it is fashionable to refer to expert witnesses-especially
57. See discussion supra Part I.C.
58. In reJames Wilson Assocs., 965 F.2d 160 (7th Cir. 1992).
59. Id. at 173 (emphasis added). The situation in In re James Wilson Associates was somewhat
similar to the medical team example judge Posner later used in the Dura Automotive case. In In re
James Wilson Associates, an architect attempted to testify about the value of a building based upon a
report provided to him by a consulting engineer, who had examined the building. Id. at 172. The
court in Dura Automotive discussed how In rejames Wilson Associates was factually similar:
[I]he issue was the state of repair of a building and "the expert who had evaluated that state-the
consulting engineer-was the one who should have testified. The architect [the expert who did
testify] could use what the engineer told him to offer an opinion within the arrhitect's domain of
expertise, but he could not testify for the purpose of vouching for the truth of what the engineer
had told him-of becoming in short the engineer's spokesman." It is the same here.
Dura Automotive, 285 F.3d at 613 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting
In rejames WilonAssocs., 965 F.2d at 173).
60. See discussion infra Part II.
61. See David E. Bernstein, The Misrbegotten Judicial Resistance to the Daubert Revolution, 89 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 27, 32-33 (2013) ("Expert testimony in the United States is therefore subject to
massive adversarial bias-bias that arises because experts are hired to advance the cause of one party
to an adversarial proceeding.").
2016] Natgading Some Deep and Troubled Juriprudential Waters 197
scientists-as "objective" or "neutral" or "unbiased,"'62  that is empty
sloganeering. The reason an advocate will prefer Expert B or C over
Expert A is because the expert ultimately engaged will be biased in favor of
the advocate's client.6' And the only reason the lawyer will be confident
in presenting either B or C as an expert is that he will have had time before
depositions and trial to prepare the witness to clarify exactly what the
64witness will say.
That is not to say all or most expert witnesses are lying about their true
opinions; to the contrary, it is recognition that, if the issue at hand is at all
nuanced and leaves room for disagreement and discretionary judgment, an
expert who has been designated to testify on behalf of a particular client,
will, by deinition, exercise judgment in favor of that client.6 s He would not
have been engaged othemise.
To avoid slipups, moreover, the lawyer and the chosen expert will
prepare for depositions and trial by thoroughly discussing and rehearsing
62. See generally David E. Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, Adversarial Bias, and the (Partial) Failure of the
Daubert Revolution, 93 IOWA L. REV. 451, 455 (2008) (indicating jurors tend to assume that an expert
witness, particularly a scientist, is likely to be unbiased).
63. See Bernstein, supra note 61, at 33 ("[I]n some cases attorneys ... would simply select from
the supply of available and honest experts those who had sincere views on the issue at hand that
happened to coincide with what the attorney needed them to say to advance his client's case.'.
Assuming that the experts were indeed honest and their views indeed sincerely held, that is exactly as
it should be.
64. See David S. Caudill, Advocag, Witnesses, and the iits of Scientific Knowledge: Is There an Ethical
Duty to Evaluate Your Expert's Testimony?, 39 IDAHO L. REv. 341, 342 (2003) (noting the public's
perception of expert witnesses is that "attorneys regularly buy expertise in a market where somebody
will testify to just about anything"). Professor Caudill has no doubt correctly reported the public's
perception, but in the author's view, that perception is badly skewed. Generally speaking, in a world
with many potential expert witnesses available in most fields, lawyers should be able to find one who
genuine# holds opinions favorable to the client without difficulty.
65. See id. at 343, 348, 354 (making several points that are germane to the arguments advanced
in this Article). Before dealing with the ethics of advocacy, which typically permit lawyers to
introduce almost any evidence that is not known (to the lawyer) to be false, Professor Caudill had to
address how a lawyer would "know" when scientific evidence was "false." In doing so, Caudill
criticized what he called an "idealized" or "oversimplified" view of science, in which scientific
opinions readily fall into one of two categories-right or wrong, genuine or junk-with no room for
discretionary judgment. Id. at 352 ("[The] tendency to see good versus junk science in law, rather
than scientific theories in confed, is indicative of a particular view of science as a field that is far
removed and different from law."). This view of science, which the author of the instant Article
refers to as "naive" rather than "idealized," is not consistent with modern understandings of science
and the scientific method. Insteadjust as with legal doctrine, much of science is contested, contingent,
and value-laden, depending on stated or unstated biases and personal agendas. Therefore, when
scientists come into the courtroom as experts, they bring more than cartoonish, good-versus-bad
opinions. Their opinions should neither be accepted nor rejected lightly, but they should be
subjected to the same vetting process (by the jury) that is applied to all testimony, including the
testimony of experts who are not scientists.
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the details of the upcoming testimony, as noted above. This process (for
expert and lay witnesses. alike, including client-witnesses) is often referred
to as "horseshedding,"6 6 and its purpose is to make the testimony more
effective without changing its basic thrust. Common advice is to avoid
technical terms, speak slowly, use everyday examples, and above all, not
volunteer information that is not asked for.6 7 However, some authorities
take a more jaundiced view and ban all but the most rudimentary witness
preparation as unethical "coaching" or "scripting," sometimes even
characterize it as suborning perjury.6
66. W. William Hodes, The Professional Duty to Horseshed Witnesses-Zealousy, Within the Bounds of
the Law, 30 TEx. TECH L. REV. 1343, 1349 (1999). In this Article, the author discussed at length the
controversial "Preparing for Your Deposition" memo that was given to hundreds of individual
plaintiffs in asbestos-mesotheioma cases handled by the Dallas law firm Baron & Budd. See id
at 1344-48 ("The Dallas law firm of Baron & Budd represented thousands of individual workers ....
[A] paralegal worker for Baron & Budd developed a detailed set of instructions and worksheets ...
titled Preparing for Your Deposition.'. The memo included color pictures of the labels on bags
containing asbestos products that had been used in various workplaces as much as forty years earlier,
tips on memorization techniques, and several reminders of the elements that would go into any
damages calculation, such as fatigue and loss of sexual enjoyment. Memorandum from Baron &
Budd to Clients 109-10, 128-30 (Aug. 1997) (on file with the St. Mary's LawJournal). The memo was
subjected to almost universal criticism and attack in the press and within the legal profession; both
criminal charges and attorney discipline grievances were filed but ultimately dismissed. Hodes, supra,
at 1346. The witnesses being prepared were individual lay clients, but the asbestos cases provided
lessons for expert testimony as well. See discussion infra Part II. After the law firm defending Baron
& Budd and its clients learned (through a press interview) that the author was one of the few
academics in the field of legal ethics who was willing, with some caveats, to defend the "Preparing for
Your Deposition" memo, he was quickly engaged as an expert witness. And of course, he was
horseshedded as well-starting in the car on the drive from the Corpus Christi airport to the
courthouse.
67. The oath that all witnesses take "to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth" is universally ignored, and properly so. See STEVEN LUBET, NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH: WHY
TRIAL LAWYERs DON'T, CAN'T, AND SHOULDN'T HAVE TO TELL THE WHOLE TRUTH 6 (2001) ("It
is impossible [for lawyers] to tell the whole truth, since life and experience are boundless and
therefore indescribable."). To tell the "whole truth" would be hopelessly time-consuming and
counterproductive-a witness to a simple automobile accident would be required to list wholly
irrelevant details, such as the names of every store on the block where the accident occurred, and
every item of clothing the witness was wearing. More important, lawyers horseshedding witnesses
instruct them not to tell the "whole truth" but only such parts of the truth that are helpful to the
lawyers' clients. Conveniently, but perfectly ethically, the lawyer then asks on direct examination only
questions that will generate helpful testimony. It is up to opposing counsel, on cross-examination
and through other witnesses, to bring out the parts of the "whole" truth that the first lawyer
deliberately left out. Under the American adversary system, if opposing counsel neglects to ask the
right questions, that is the opposing lawyer's problem (and his client's). See LUBET, supra, at 7-9, for
a fascinating account of how this feature of the adversary system works in practice, focusing on some
famous real and fictional trials, which includes cases involving O.J. Simpson, John Brown, Wyatt
Earp, Atticus Finch, and Sheila McGough.
68. The best defense for aggressive witness preparation was the typically iconoclastic chapter,
entitled "Counseling the Client: Refreshing Recollection or Prompting Perjury?," found in MONROE
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Ultimately, all of this means that, although expert witnesses do not have
a finanial interest in the outcome of cases in which they testify-expert
witnesses may not be paid a contingent fee6'-they are clearly aligned
professionally with the party engaging them. Because an expert's
testimony will be prepared and presented by a lawyer from that party's side
and his expertise and credibility will be attacked by a lawyer from the other
side, it is inevitable that professional pride and personal vindication, if
nothing else, will dictate that an expert crave victory for his side.
But in the overall effort to win, an expert witness plays a distinct and
limited role on the advocacy team subordinate to the leading role played by
the lawyer representing the client in the case. An expert witness is
permitted to give sworn testimony about one thing only: his own honestly
held opinions and conclusions that are relevant to the case. He cannot
testify about the underlying facts but must base his opinions on whatever
facts he assumes will be determined by the jury to be true.70  At the same
time, an expert witness cannot make arguments about the law, even if he is
a lawyer." Indeed, an expert witness-even a lawyer-can only assume
H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 59-77 (1975). The argument was
reworked and refined in a chapter carrying the less provocative title "Counseling Clients and
Preparing Witnesses," found in MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING
LAWYERS' ETHICS 187 (4th ed. 2010). Professor Freedman, long recognized as one of the country's
stoutest defenders of uncompromising client-centered adversary ethics, did not shrink from
acknowledging that an unscrupulous client who was told the details of what the law required to
prevail might tailor or even fabricate his testimony accordingly. But Freedman balanced against this
the reality that if some legally significant points were withheld from the client being horseshedded, an
honest and conscientious client might not remember salient facts or might even suppress certain
helpful facts in the mistaken belief that they were harmful. In the asbestos cases, for example, an
elderly client would be unlikely to discuss his sex life with a young attorney or paralegal unless
prompted to do so. Since it cannot be known in advance whether aggressive witness preparation will
lead to dishonest estimony or to truthful but more effective testimony in any particular case, Monroe
Freedman gave the client the benefit of the doubt. In the author's later article, The Pmfessiona/Duty to
Horseshed Witnesses-Zealously, Within the Bounds of the Law (hereafter Horseshed Witnesses), he relied
heavily on Professor Freedman's work, but as the full title implies, only up to the point where the
lawyer knows that the client is up to no good: a lawyer's obligation is to provide zealous
representation within the bounds of law. Hodes, supra note 66, at 1355-56. In this context, "law"
includes the Rules of Professional Conduct, where formally adopted, and Model Rule 3.3(a)(3), which
prohibits a lawyer from "offer[ing] evidence that the lawyer knows to be false." MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCr r. 3.3(a)(3) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013).
69. Model Rule 3.4(b) forbids a lawyer from, among other things, "offer[ing] an inducement to
a witness that is prohibited by law." MODEL RULES r. 3.4(b). Statutory or common law in all or
virtually all American jurisdictions prohibits the payment of fees to an expert witness that are
contingent upon the efficacy of his later testimony.
70. See discussion supra Part I.C.
71. See discussion infra Part II. In Horseshed Witnesses, the author stated that his testimony
(which was in the form of an affidavit) was "an advocacy document." Hodes, supra note 66, at 1351.
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what law the court will deem to be applicable to the case, even where that
is not greatly in doubt."
In the end, the advocate on the team blends the expert's testimony into
the overall effort; first, by making legal arguments to the court to establish
the assumed legal universe; and second, by proving to the jury's satisfaction,
the assumed facts that will make the expert's opinions are germane and
helpful.
F. Expert Witnesses and the Ethics ofAdvocay
To many laypersons, and even some lawyers and judges, the selection,
preparation, and use of expert witnesses" is a scandal--one example
among many of a justice system that has gone off the rails. It conjures up
the image of hired-guns spouting junk science they do not genuinely
believe in or experts as whores "assuming a certain position for money" as
the saying goes. This is an unjustifiably cynical view, however, and is
based on a near-complete misunderstanding of the adversary system and
adversary ethics.
First, in all but the rarest case of an unforeseen third-party witness, who
happened to be present at the time of the events giving rise to a lawsuit, no
testimony is disinterested or unbiased. In a simple automobile collision
case or a slip-and-fall, for example, both the plaintiff and the defendant
will remember details differently and will emphasize different aspects of
the underlying facts.
This does not mean that one or both of the parties are lying, although
that is a possibility. Instead, each side's lawyer puts forward the most
helpful facts and details, omits unhelpful testimony and evidence, and
attempts to punch holes in the other side's "story." The jury, taking into
account the interests of most of the witnesses, determines what weight to give to
This was technically accurate under the peculiar circumstances of the case described below, but it was
a gaffe that has been thrown back in his face on a few occasions. What the author meant to say, or
should have said, is the point made in the text as a general proposition: although an expert witness is
not an advocate and can only testify under oath about the content of his genuinely held opinions, that
testimony is an integral part of the overall advocay presentation orchestrated by the lawyer. The author's
statement was not wrong in the specific context of the proceeding in state court in Corpus Christi,
however, because that proceeding was a heating on a discovery motion, with no jury present, and
about a matter of law to boot (whether the "Preparing for Your Deposition" memo was privileged or
whether the privilege had been lost through application of the crime-fraud exception). Ironically,
therefore, under the positions the author espouses in this Article, he should not have been allowed to
testify at all.
72. See discussion infra Part II.
73. See discussion supra Part I.E.
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each snippet of the testimony and exhibits and fuses it all into a single
verdict. Expert testimony is treated exactly the same way, as it should be.
The jury will know that each expert witness has been paid for his time and
that each is serving the team of the party proffering his testimony.
Second, and more fundamentally, critics, queasy about the
horseshedding of witnesses, are almost always caught up in a romantic and
naive view of the adversary system itself. They do not accept the
sometimes unlovely fact that an American jury trial is not an all-out, let-the-
chips-fall-where-they-may search for the truth but is instead an attempt by
each side to obscure unhelpful parts of the truth within limits established by
law," including procedural law, evidence law, and the law of lawyering."
The literature debating the limits of advocacy is vast, including not only
academic and practice-based works but also thousands of judicial opinions
and ethics rulings. For purposes of this Article, which is limited to
presentation of expert testimony, it is sufficient to say the chief boundary
line is that a lawyer may not knowingly "offer evidence that the lawyer
knows to be false.""6 At the other end of the spectrum, a lawyer has
discretion to withhold evidence (without fear of being charged with lack of
diligence or, probably, legal malpractice) if "the lawyer reasonably believes [it]
74. See e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOwITZ, REASONABLE DOUBTS: THE O.J. SIMPSON CASE AND
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 166 (1996) ("[A] criminal trial is anything but a pure search for
truth. When defense attorneys represent guilty clients-as most do, most of the time-their
responsibility is to try, by all fair and ethical means, to prevent the truth about their client's guilt from
emerging." (emphasis added)). The author collected considerable authority on that basic point,
including the above quote from Professor Dershowitz and including the famous passage from Justice
Byron White's dissent in United States v. Wade, which ended as follows:
Undoubtedly there are some limits which defense counsel must observe, but more often than
not, defense counsel will cross-examine a prosecution witness, and impeach him if he can, even
if he thinks the witness is telling the truth, just as he will attempt to destroy a witness who he
thinks is lying. In this respect, as part of our modified adversary system and as part of the duty
imposed on the most honorable defense counsel, we countenance or require conduct which in
many instances has little, if any, relation to the search for truth.
W. William Hodes, Seeking the Truth Versus Telling the Truth at the Boundaries of the Law: Misdirection,
Lying, and 'Lying aith an Explanation", 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 53, 57 (2002) (footnote omitted) (quoting
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 258 (1967) (White, J., dissenting)).
75. The "law of lawyering" is understood to encompass what was in the past referred to as
"legal ethics" or "professional ethics" plus other statutory and court-made rules and common law
principles governing the conduct of lawyers. See generally GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., W. WILLIAM
HODES & PETER R. JARVIS, THE LAW OF LAWYERING (4th ed. Supp. 2015).
76. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013) ("A lawyer shall
not knowingly: ... (3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.... A lawyer may refuse to
offer evidence, other than the testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter, that the lawyer
reasonably believes is false.").
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is false.""
These baseline rules generate several secondary inquiries that are far
beyond the scope of this Article. First, what is meant by "false" in this
context? Must the witness know his own testimony is false, making the
testimony perjurious? Or is it sufficient if the presenting lanyer knows the
testimony is false, even if the witness believes that it is true?"
Second, what does it mean for a lawyer to "know" that certain evidence
is false, and how can that knowledge be proven? The question, "What
does a lawyer know?" is by itself a subject of major moral, ethical, and
epistemological debate." Rule 1.0(f) of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct defines knowledge as "actual knowledge of the fact in
question"so and then goes on to say that "a person's knowledge may be
inferred from circumstances.""1 One of the "circumstances," of course, is
that lawyers are highly educated professionals, experienced in judging
ambiguous situations. This means that at some point, giving a client the
benefit of the doubt turns into willful blindness, moral irresponsibility, or
"brute rationalization," as Monroe Freedman once wrote." Similarly,
Comment 8 to Model Rule 3.3, after noting the above definition from
Rule 1.0(f), states that "although a lawyer should resolve doubts about the
veracity of testimony or other evidence in favor of the client, the lawyer
cannot ignore an obvious falsehood."8 3
And what of the duties of a lawyer who is an expert witness in a
contested matter, rather than an advocate? He is not functioning as a
lanyer in the matter, so the formal rules regarding the limits of advocacy
(like Model Rule 3.3) do not apply. But even when a lawyer is "off-duty"
in the sense that he is not counseling or representing a client, he is still a
77. See id. r. 3.3(a)(3) (emphasis added) (allowing counsel to withhold evidence that is
reasonably believed to be false does not extend to the testimony of the defendant in a criminal case;
otherwise, the discretion granted to the lawyer is broad).
78. See HAZARD, HODES & JARVIS, supra note 75, § 32.11 (taking the view that the broader
interpretation should be adopted, because the point of Rule 3.3 is to prevent false information that the
lawyer can interdict from sending the court or the jury off in a wrong direction).
79. Many of the arguments are summarized in HAZARD, HODES & JARVIS, supra note 75,
§5 1.23-1.24. With respect to expert testimony in particular, especially scientific expert testimony,
see Caudill, supra note 64, at 352, who wrote, "Law is . . . unstable, adversarial, rhetorical,
institutional, and value-laden, while science is characterized by universal standards, rigorous
methodologies and testing, and consensus."
80. MODEL RULES r. 1.0(0.
81. Id.
82. See FREEDMAN, spra note 68, at 75 ('There does come a point, however, where nothing
less than 'brute rationalization' can purport to justify a conclusion that the lawyer is seeking in good
faith to elicit truth rather than actively participating in the creation of perjury.").
83. MODEL RULES r. 3.3 cmt. 8.
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lawyer, and his conduct is governed by norms that go beyond those that
apply to nonlawyer-experts."
The balance of this Article attempts to answer the questions thus raised:
How should on- and off-duty lawyers interact in the presentation of expert
testimony? And, how will their interaction affect the quality of the justice
system in which they are participating?
II. LAWYERS As EXPERT WITNESSES-MORE OF THE SAME, BUT
FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT
When a lawyer takes the stand as an expert witness, the fine
jurisprudential balance is in danger of becoming displaced and deranged,
although the basic tweaks to the rules of evidence remain the same.8 s
Helpful opinions, even respecting ultimate issues, are not only still
welcome but also are still necessary to avoid pure (and unfair) guesswork
by jurors who have no prior learning or experience in the area. At the
other end of the spectrum, opinions that are mere speculation-not
connected to the specific facts of the case or rest on the "air" of evidence
never seen or heard by the jury"-will still be excluded, no matter how
well qualified the expert.
But despite these basic similarities, lawyer-experts and other experts are
fundamentally different. They differ as a matter of practice because
lawyer-experts are trained in the arts of communication and persuasion
and may make disguised testimony about the facts seem more like actual
testimony about the facts;` more important, they differ jurisprudentially,
because, unlike other experts, lanyers are almost always called upon to give
opinions that implicate the content of the law applicable to the case.
Blend these two factors together and you have the "deep and troubled
jurisprudential waters" of this Article's title. First, there is not only a
danger that lawyer-experts will give disguised testimony about the facts
(which they can only assume and not actually "know," at least in the sense
of being able to testify about it under oath)" but there is the additional
danger that they will use their lawyering skills to "advocate" in favor of the
truth or correctness of those facts-which even the lanyer presenting their
84. See id. r. 8.4 (broadening the scope of professional responsibility of a lawyer to not "engage
in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice," without regard to whether the lawyer is
acting as a representative or some other capacity); see also discussion supra Part II.
85. See discussion supra Part I.
86. See discussion supra note 54 and accompanying text.
87. See discussion supra Part I.C.
88. See discussion supra Part I.C.
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testimony cannot ethicaly do.8 9
Second, and more important, lawyer-experts constantly flirt with, and
often cross, the line between testimony-including disguised testimony-
about the facts and testimony (disguised or implicit) about the law. But once
a lawyer speaks in favor of one understanding of the law as opposed to
some other understanding, he has ceased being a witness altogether and
has become a full-throated advocate."0 That further suggests supposed
"testimony" given under oath is no longer testimony at all-it is legal
argument.
The capstone is that a lawyer who switches roles from testifying witness
to partisan lawyer also sheds one set of ethical obligation and dons
another. A sworn witness is obligated to tell the truth, including the truth
89. See MODEL RULES r. 3.4(e) ("A lawyer shall not ... assert personal knowledge of facts in
issue except when testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the
credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an accused.'.
90. In Caudill, supra note 2, the author argued throughout that, especially in legal malpractice
cases, lawyer-expert witnesses risk invading the province of both the jury and the judge by becoming
advocates, because it is almost impossible to separate supposed "factual" testimony from
argumentation about "law." Id. at 315-16. The author was in attendance in San Antonio, Texas,
where Professor Caudill delivered his talk at the 2015 St. May's La, journal on Legal Maorackce &
Ethics Symposium, and quickly agreed with the staff of the Journalto write this follow-on Article. For
a discussion in more detail on the specific problems caused when the lines between law and fact; and
advocacy and testimony are erased, see discussion infra Part H.A. In an earlier article, also published
in this journal, Professor Caudill again focused on the law-fact distinction, this time to suggest that
the traditional hard and fast rule against testimony "about" the law might be relaxed in certain cases
where the law was uncertain or complex, so that even after being properly instructed, jurors would
have difficulty applying the concepts to the purely factual findings they had made. See Caudill, supra
note 1, at 141 ("In reality, however, there are numerous exceptions to the ideal, which calls into
question any clear distinction between law and fact."). In The Roles of Attomys as Courtroom Experfs:
Revisiting the Conventional Limitations and Their Exceptions (hereafter Roles ofAttornys), Caudill considered
the possibility that mixed questions of law and fact, such as whether the standard of care in a legal
malpractice case had been breached, would be appropriate occasions to relax the general rule and
openly allow testimony about matters that would otherwise be considered questions of law, and thus
for the trial court alone to deal with in instructions. Id. at 147-49, 158-60, 164-65. Caudill noted the
recognized exceptions to legal expert testimony but conceded that "while the judiciary is presumed to
need no expert legal testimony and the jury is presumed to get all the law it needs from the judge's
instructions, the inconsistent application of the prohibition demonstrates the genuine need ... for
expert legal testimony." Id. at 165 (footnotes omitted). The author takes a stricter view, using a
series of "standard of care" examples to demonstrate that it is both possible and desirable to
maintain a sharp distinction even in that context. See discussion infra Part II.B. That is not because
the line between law and fact can be firmly drawn in the abstract-on that point, the author agrees
with Professor Caudill-but because it is institutionally preferable for the trial court alone (with the
help of the contending advocates) to deal with the "legal" side of mixed questions, leaving witnesses
(including expert witnesses) to deal with the "factual" side. It is possible, however, that the author's
view and Caudill's view in Roles ofAttornys are little more than two routes to the same result. As will
be discussed infra, the author does agree that in the standard of care example, an expert witness will
still be required to help the jury fit the facts to the law that they have been given and might involve
some explanation of how that law actually plays out in the real world.
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about his own beliefs and opinions. An advocate, on the other hand, is not
required to believe in the soundness of the arguments he is making; his
only obligation is to stay within the bounds of frivolousness.91
A. Law Versus Fact and the "SpecialiZed Knowledge" that Lanyer-Experts Do
and Do Not Have
Lawyers serving as expert witnesses are subject to the same
requirements of relevance and reliability as all other expert witnesses.9 2 In
most jurisdictions, expert opinion testimony is "relevant" only if it "will
help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue."" In the large majority of jurisdictions that follow the Daubert
approach,9 4 expert testimony is "reliable" only if based on sound science
or specialized knowledge grounded in experience or practice that jurors
typically will not have.
But what is it, exactly, that lawyers bring to the stand as expert
witnesses? What is their specialized knowledge?" Armed with years of
post-graduate training and experience, plus subscriptions to Westlaw and
LexisNexis, they concededly know more than jurors do about the content
of applicable legal doctrines, as glossed by the most recent case law in the
jurisdiction.
No one contends, however, that they should be allowed to testi to ajug
under oath that such and such a court case has this meaning rather than that
meaning, or that a particular statute or rule does or does not mean what it
appears to say." Such disagreements must be argued to the court by lawyer-
91. Compare MODEL RULES r. 3.1 ("A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert
or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law or fact for doing so that is not
frivolous."), and id. r. 3.1 cmt. 2 (explaining frivolousness as the inability "to make a good faith
argument on the merits of the action taken or to support the action taken by a good faith argument
for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law"), with id. r. 3.3 (allowing a lawyer to offer
evidence that he reasonabl bekeves is false), and id. r. 3.3 cmts. 3, 7-9 (allowing a lawyer to offer false
evidence if he reasonab/ beleves the evidence is false, in effect mandating such conduct because
otherwise the lawyer might be accused of providing ineffective assistance of council).
92. See discussion supra Part IA.
93. FED. R. EVID. 702(a).
94. See discussion supra Part I.A.
95. Whatever specialized knowledge lawyer-experts have, it was not gained as a result of the
kind of scientific inquiry considered in Daubert. Instead, lawyers bring their personal knowledge, skill,
experience, training, and education, as permitted by Kumbo Tire, the most important case after
Daubert. See discussion supra Part I.A.
96. Professor David Caudill does not argue to the contrary in Roles ofAtornys. See discussion
supra note 90 and accompanying text. His point in that article was that in some situations, roughly
those usefully described as involving mixed questions of law and fact, it may be appropriate for a
lawyer-expert to assist the jury in working through how to "apply" the law to the facts that it has
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advocates, not under oath, rather than lawyer-witnesses.
Still, experts are usually needed to testify about how the law should be
applied to the specific facts of the case-facts that have been found by the
jury. That is nothing more (or less) than opinion testimony about an
ultimate issue in the case, such as whether the defendant-lawyer breached
the standard of care in a legal malpractice case or whether the defendant
committed a breach of fiduciary duty. So long as the court retains full
authority to define the standard of care or what the duties of a fiduciary
are, it is perfectly acceptable for an expert witness to help the jury close the
circle and reach a verdict about whether those legal standards have been
breached or satisfied.9
B. Breach of the Standard of Care in Legal Malp ractice Cases: Defining the Legal
Standard, Determining the Underlying Facts, and Reaching an Ultimate
Conclusion
A telling and often-debated example of the division of labor between
the court, the jury, advocate-lawyers, and lawyer-expert witnesses is
provided by the proper handling of the critical element of breach of the
standard of care in legal malpractice cases." According to the principles
described immediately above,9 it should follow that the trial court will
first determine and then instruct the jury what the standard of care is,
because that is a purely legal question. In making that legal determination,
the court will be assisted by the advocates on both sides, and no expert
witness-lawyer or lay person-will play any role.
But expert witnesses will have an essential role to play when the jury
must determine whether the court-defined standard has been met or breached,
because that is matter of fact, or at least application of law to facts, which
found. See Caudill, supra note 1, at 161 (explaining that an ordinary juror would be unable to
determine the standard by which an attorney's behavior is determined or measure the attorney's
conduct without the help from an expert such as another attorney). In doing so, a lawyer-expert
may have to explain, under oath to boot, how certain legal principles "work" in practice, but that is a
far cry from saying what the law "is."
97. See discussion supra Part I.B.
98. In most American jurisdictions, the tort of legal malpractice requires the plaintiff to plead
and prove four elements: (1) that a lawyer-client relationship existed between the defendant and the
plaintiff, thus creating a duty, (2) that the defendant breached the duties owed to the plaintiff, typically
by failing to satisfy the applicable standard of care; (3) that breach proximately caused harm to the
plaintiff; and (4) that the plaintiff was damaged thereby. Often, elements three and four are merged
into a single element. Hedrick v. Tabbert, 722 N.E.2d 1269, 1272 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
Interestingly, the Tabbed court relied on, without further comment, Rice v. Strunk, 670 N.E.2d 1280,
1283-84 (Ind. 1996), a case listing all four of the standard elements.
99. See discussion supra Part II.A.
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is quintessentially a jury function. A lawyer-expert helps the jury come to
its verdict by bringing experience about how the legal standard defined by
the court "fits" the historical facts that the jury has found.
Consider the following thought experiment. Assume four mine-run
legal malpractice cases, with identical facts, arise at the same time in
four separate (hypothetical) jurisdictions in the United States. At the time
these cases are filed, the law governing the standard of care in each state
appears to be well-settled-keeping in mind that these are common law
doctrines that are always subject to revision, modification, or
abandonment.
Although the case law set out below establishing the four standards of
care is perforce as hypothetical as the states in which the cases arise, at
least the first three are based on language that has appeared in real court
opinions in the United States.'0 0 With those caveats, the four standards
are as follows:
STATE A
In a legal malpractice case decided in 1947, the Supreme Court of A
said:
It is more tiresome than difficult to state the elements of the tort of legal
malpractice in this State. To prevail, the plaintiff must prove (a) the
existence of a lawyer-client relationship with the defendant; (b) that the
defendant failed to exerrise the care and skill that men of the legalprofession commonly, or
ordinarily, possess and exerdse under the ircumstances; and (c) that the defendant's
failure proximately caused the injury of which the plaintiff now complains.
This passage has been cited with approval in hundreds of State A appellate
court opinions in the ensuing years; the only deviation being in 2012, when
the Supreme Court of A announced that element (b) should, "in keeping
with modern mores and with the realities of modern practice, be amended
to refer to 'men and women of the legalprofession."'
STATE B
In a legal malpractice case decided in 1994, the Supreme Court of B
said:
In our past jurisprudence, and in the jurisprudence of essentially all of our
100. The fourth approach to defining the standard of care has not been adopted by any court,
but there has been considerable discussion of it within the legal profession. Some courts appear to
be moving in that direction, and in the author's view, it is only a matter of time before it becomes
"the law" somewhere in the United States.
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sister states, the standard of care has been pegged at what a lawyer commonly
or ordinarily would have done in like circumstances, or sometimes at what a
lawyer of average skill and learning would have done, assuming that the lawyer
also exercised average care.
This is problematic because of the notorious difficulty of proving or
disproving to a jury what is "common" or "ordinary" or "average." But it is
troubling for a more fundamental reason-hewing to those standards
removes any incentive for the profession as a whole to improve or innovate,
and ossifies past practice into perpetual practice.
Accordingly, we hold that a legal malpractice plaintiff must henceforth prove
that the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care and skill in carying out the matters
entrusted to him. To be sure, proving or disproving reasonableness is not without
its own difficulties, but it is a difficulty commonly encountered in the law.
The main point, though, is that if lawyers in our state have commonly
engaged in an unreasonable practice in the past, that practice should become
less common after today's decision and should eventually cease.
STATE C
In a legal malpractice case decided in 1904, the Supreme Court of C
said:
The English common law rule in these kinds of cases was that a lawyer
would not be found to liable to his client in the absence of gross negligence or
gross incompetence.
This rule has been criticized as insufficiently solicitous of the interests of
clients, who typically do not meet their lawyers on an even plane when it
comes to awareness of the hazards of legal matters. On the other, to hold
lawyers to respond in damages for a mistaken judgment taken in good faith,
or for the merely negligent conduct of their offices, is likely to breed timidity
and stagnation in the legal profession. In the absence of a compelling reason
to do so, we will not disturb the common law rule.
In a 2007 case, the same Court noted:
For something over one hundred years, our decision has been subjected to
savage criticism in the legal journals, but without reference to any empirical
evidence that citizens in our state have suffered from a glut of harmful
lawyering. The compelling reason that we could not find in 1904 still eludes
us, and we therefore continue to decline to abandon a rule that has served us
well for a century, and our forefathers for several centuries before that. To
prevail in a legal malpractice action in this state, a plaintiff must show gross
neglgence or gross incompetence on the part of the lawyer.
STATE D
In a legal malpractice case decided in 2013, the Supreme Court of D
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said:
Too much ink has been spilled and too many trees have been killed in
endless debate (in both court opinions and academic writings) about the
proper relationship between the standard of care in legal malpractice cases
and the standard of conduct required by the rules of professional conduct.
Almost every court that has faced the issue heretofore, including the courts
of D, has held that while the rules of legal ethics may be "relevant to"
establishing the standard of care or the breach of the standard of care in a
legal malpractice case, they are not in and of themselves an independent font
of tort liability.
This is too formalistic, however. The reason that rules of professional
conduct are routinely held to be at least "some evidence" of the standard of
care for use in private party litigation is that both the rules and the common
law principles at play in litigation are ultimately the responsibility of this
Court, based on this Court's understanding of the public policy of D. Thus,
the rationale for treating the two sets of norms as closely intertwined is
obvious, but the rationale for stopping short at "relevant to" or "some
evidence of" is not.
Accordingly, we hold that a legal malpractice plaintiff may establish breach
of the standard of care, in addition to the manner heretofore allowed, by
proving (by a preponderance of the evidence) a violation of one of the mandatoU rules of the
State D Rules of Professional Conduct. This is not an abstract proposition;
however, to satisfy the standing requirement, the plaintiff must also
demonstrate that violation of the rpecic rule in question is what proximatel caused the
plaintif's injut.-
To sum up, in State A, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant
exercised something less than common or ordinary care and skill, whereas as in
State B, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant exercised something
less than reasonable care or skill, whether or not it was common or ordinary in the
jurisdiction. In State C, the plaintiff must prove gross negligence or gross
incompetence, while in State D any violation of a mandatory rule of
professional conduct affecting the plaintiff is sufficient.
It is perfectly evident that a lawyer representing the plaintiff or the
defendant in one of these states will take discovery and plan trial strategy
differently, depending upon which of the four states is the forum state. It
should be just as obvious that the testimony of a lawyer-expert (presented
by either side) will differ radically in the case pending in each jurisdiction.
As an example, it would be useless for a plaintiff's expert in State C to
offer the opinion that the defendant failed to act "with reasonable care";
indeed, such an opinion would be stricken as irrelevant and thus
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inadmissible, because in State C only testimony going to gross negligence or
incompetence is germane. Taking it a step further, the advocates in each
jurisdiction will choose and prepare their lawyer-experts with the existing
law in the jurisdiction firmly in view.'0o
Because the lawyer-expert's testimony must thus be tailored to the law
in the jurisdiction, which is the mildest and least objectionable form of
horseshedding,'02 it further follows that the expert must agree to assume
the existence of that legal universe in formulating his opinions. Certainly
the expert cannot "testify" (to a jury or to the court) about the content of
the law. 0 3 Nor can the expert make arguments to the court about which
standard should be adopted for purposes of the case at hand.'0 4
In the standard of care thought experiment, the four hypothetical
standards were stated to be "well-settled," but this only accentuates the
fact that the expert is "stuck" with them and must base any testimony on
the assumption that the jury will be instructed precisely that way about the
law. 0 5
Suppose, however, the law was in flux or a non-frivolous argument for
modification was available? A lawyer-expert still has no authority to make
those arguments-that is the role of the advocate planning to present his
opinion testimony. At best, the expert is still stuck with, and must assume,
the legal universe that the advocate agrees is the best approximation of the
law as it stands as the case begins.'o6 If the law changes during the case,
101. See Caudill, supra note 1, at 149 (stressing the importance of knowing the law of a
jurisdiction and demonstrating how a plaintiffs expert may be excluded depending on the applicable
law and how the expert testimony is formulated).
102. See discussion supra Part I.E.
103. See Caudill, supra note 2, at 315-16 (noting standard practice limits an attorney-expert to
testimony about the facts, because testimony as an expert in law would invade the province of the
court).
104. See Caudill, supra note 1, at 159 (noting "the general rule that expert witnesses are not to
testify as to what the law is but only to assess the facts as to how the attorney acted in relation to the
law'.
105. William P. (Bill) Smith, Ethics Counsel to the Office of the General Counsel of the State
Bar of Georgia and, for some thirty years, the General Counsel, responsible for the prosecution of
lawyer discipline cases in the state, made a telling comment on this point at one of the innumerable
CLE presentations he gave. Referring to the law that would be applicable in any particular case,
regardless of the bar admission or office location of any of the participating lawyers, he invited the
audience to imagine a trial judge announcing from the bench that just for one day the court was
going to apply the law of Zimbabwe! No one would be any less qualified to participate in the case
because they were not admitted to the Bar of Zimbabwe, yes, but all would have to tailor their
presentations to the new legal baseline.
106. But see Caudill, supra note 1, at 155 (proposing recognition of an exception to the general
rule against expert legal testimony where the law is unsettled or uncertain).
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the expert will be obligated to adjust his testimony as well-the origin
opinions will no longer even be germane.
The distinction made through use of the thought experiment-between
defining or establishing the standard of care as a matter of law and proving
whether it has been breached as a matter fact--can best be illustrated by a
real-life, negative example. Jing Hong Song v. Collins' was a routine legal
malpractice case in which the client (Jing) claimed she had executed a
custody and visitation agreement with her former husband in their divorce
action only because her former lawyer (Collins) had advised her that it was
temporary and would be easy to modify. 0 8 That turned out not to be the
case.
During the jury trial, both the plaintiff and the defendant presented
expert testimony about whether the former lawyer had breached the
standard of care for matrimonial lawyers who deal with custody and
visitation issues, but neither party explicitly discussed what the standard
actually was.o' It would be fair to say, however, that both appeared to
have assumed what it was, discussed it implicitly, and had no particular
disagreements on the point.
But the jury was instructed to answer the following special interrogatory
and answered it in the negative: "Did the plaintiff prove, by a fair
preponderance of the evidence, the standard of care applicable to the
defendant?""o As a result, the jury was required to return a verdict in
favor of the defendant-lawyer."' That verdict was upheld by the trial
court and on appeal." 2
The Appellate Court of Connecticut stated that in Connecticut, a legal
malpractice plaintiff "must present expert testimony to establish the
standard of proper professional skill or care.... [Expert testimony will
assist lay jurors] to understand the applicable standard of care and to evaluate
the defendant's actions in light of that standard."' "
The second of those propositions is universally accepted, as discussed
throughout this Article: expert witnesses are needed to help the jury
perform its fact-finding function, even if in the process the expert must
state conclusions that implicate an ultimate issue (here, whether the lawyer
107. Jing Hong Song v. Collins, 97 A.3d 1024 (Conn. App. 2014).
108. Id. at 1025.
109. Id. at 1027.
110. Id. at 1025 (emphasis added).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1026-27 (emphasis added).
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breached the standard of care). 114
But the statement that expert testimony is needed to establish the
standard is distinctly odd and was made more so when the appellate court
stated, in the next paragraph on the same page, exactly what the applicable
standard was, cleanly and without equivocation: "The standard of care
applicable to the defendant. . in the present case was the 'degree of skill
and learning commonly applied under all the circumstances in the
community by the average prudent reputable member of the
profession. . . .""'1s The court cited one of its own decisions from 2006
as authority, and it is clear that of the four hypothetical standards given
earlier, the real Connecticut standard most closely resembles that of State
A.
It remains a mystery, however, why an expert witness should be allowed
to testify about the standard itself, let alone why expert testimony is
required, on pain of loss or dismissal of the plaintiffs suit. It is just as
much a mystery what an expert witness would testify to under oath. It is
hard to imagine that any court would countenance a lawyer-expert who
testifies, "In my opinion, the standard of care is as stated in the 2006
appellate court decision, and I came to that conclusion because my
research shows that the case has neither been overruled nor disapproved
114. See FED. R. EVID. 402 advisory committee's note (1972 proposed rules); see also discussion
supra Part I.B.
115. Jing Hong Song, 97 A.3d at 1027. The same awkward approach can be seen in some Indiana
cases, such as Oxley v. Lenn, where it was the defendant rather than the plaintiff who lost out-this
time at the summary judgment stage than after a jury verdict. Oxley v. Lenn, 819 N.E.2d 851 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2004).
In Oxley, the defendant-lawyer, Lenn, had neglected to tender a summons to accompany the
complaint he had filed for his client. As a result, Oxley's suit was dismissed as untimely, which led to
the malpractice suit. Lenn moved for summary judgment, arguing that when he filed the complaint,
the Indiana authorities were in conflict about the requisite timing of the summons, so his inaction
could not constitute malpractice as a matter of law. The trial court granted the motion, but the court
of appeals reversed and remanded for trial, holding that even though the facts were undisputed,
summary judgment was inappropriate because those facts did not lead inexorably to only one
conclusion:
We cannot agree with the trial court's conclusion that the existence of a conflict of law
automatically tenders an attorney's action or inaction as not negligent. Instead, it is for the jury
to determine, given the then existing conflict of case law, whetherLenn breached his duty byfaing to
exerdse ordinary skill and knowledge when he failed to tender the summons at the time he filed the
complaint. Furthermore, expert estimony is usually required in a legal malpractice action to establish the
standard of care by which the defendant attorney's conduct is measured.
Oxley, 819 N.E.2d at 857 (emphasis added). Once again, the second sentence simply does not match
the first. The court of appeals correctly stated the governing Indiana standard of care without
hesitation in the first sentence-"ordinary skill and knowledge"-and so expert testimony on the
subject should be barred, not required. Id.
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by the Connecticut Supreme Court."
Instead, with all of the pieces in place, it should be a simple matter for
the trial court to instruct the jury that the standard is as quoted above and
that the jury must decide based on the testimony, including expert
testimony, whether the standard had been satisfied or breached. In such a
regime, the plaintiffs expert would testify along the following lines: "I
have assumed that the court will instruct the jury that the standard of care
is as stated in the 2006 appellate court decision; it is then my opinion that
the defendant breached that standard in several ways, based on my long
experience handling matrimonial cases in Connecticut."'1 6
The Connecticut approach is to let the jury decide whether the plaintiff
has established the standard of care,"' whereas the traditional approach
the author advocates is to instruct the jury what the courts have
"established" as the governing standard and let the jury decide whether
that standard has been satisfied. A subtle distinction? Perhaps, but the
distinction is as real and important as the Anglo-American jurisprudential
sea is wide.
C. Misuse ofLanyer-Experts in Proving or Disproving the Facts Regarding Breach
of the Standard of Care or Breach of Fidua Duty
If the division of function between the advocates, the witnesses, the
court, and the jury is properly maintained,' there will be no disguised
testimony or advocacy or argument by lawyer-experts about the applicable
legal standard.' The task of "say[ing] what the law is"120 wll remain
solely in the hands of judges, aided by the legal argument of lawyer-
advocates, while neither lawyer-experts nor jurors will have any input.
But there is still an enhanced danger that lawyer-expert witnesses will
improperly influence the jury through disguised testimony about the facts,
and, to a lesser degree, through parroting the testimony of witnesses who
116. The jury verdict in the Jing Hong Song case might well come out the same way, but for the
simple and jurisprudentially sound reason that the jury did not believe the testimony suggesting that
Jing's lawyer did not perform as an "average prudent reputable member of the profession" would
have. Jing Hong Song, 97 A.3d at 1027 (quoting Dixon v. Bromson & Reiner, 898 A.2d 193, 195
(Conn. App. 2006)).
117. Id. at 1026-27.
118. See discussion supra Part II.B.
119. See FED. R. EVID. 705 (declaring an expert witness may present an opinion without first
testifying to the central facts).
120. One of the most notable quotations in all of American law comes from one of the most
notable cases: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
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do not appear at the trial. 12 1
Disguised testimony about the facts occurs when an expert witness
confidently states an opinion that is of necessity based on certain facts of
which the expert has no personal knowledge. Unless the jury is made
aware that the opinion is actually conditional-upon those facts being
found to be true by the ju itsel--there is a danger the jury will instead take
the expert's opinion to be evidence tending to prove those same facts.
The following hypothetical, which is based on a real case that is still in
litigation, demonstrates how badly disguised testimony can obscure what is
truly in contest and thus distort the judicial process.
In the hypothetical version of the real case, suppose that a lawyer is
representing the owner of a small business in commercial litigation against
a supplier who reneged on several contracts and caused the plaintiff's
business to fail. Discovery has been completed and the date for a jury trial
has been set-and then continued twice due to illness and other
scheduling difficulties. With the trial now only five weeks away, the lawyer
schedules a mediation that his client only reluctantly agrees to attend-the
plaintiff thinks it is a waste of time and would much prefer to have his day
in court anyway.
The mediation quickly stalls, and everyone agrees by mid-afternoon
there has been essentially no progress. At this point, the facts as told by
the plaintiff and his lawyer diverge dramatically. According to the business
owner, his lawyer-without any warning-presented him with a final
proposal for settlement and threatened to withdraw from the case on the
spot, unless the client immediately signed it. Unaware that a lawyer cannot
withdraw in such circumstances without court approval, knowing that he
could not possibly find a new lawyer and bring him up to speed in just five
weeks, and shell-shocked by the suddenness of the betrayal by his own
lawyer, the plaintiff signed the agreement, even though he furiously stated
that the settlement amount was grossly inadequate.
The lawyer, on the other hand, defended the settlement as the best that
could be obtained at the mediation and expressed great doubt that a better
result could have been obtained if the case had proceeded to trial. More
important, while agreeing that he had argued strenuously in favor of the
settlement, the attorney denied coercing his client or making any threats to
withdraw. The lawyer also agreed that the business owner had initially
opposed the deal but stated that, in the end, the client agreed to accept it
of his own free will, and did not express further disagreement.
121. See discussions supra Parts I.C.-D.
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The client sues the lawyer for legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary
duty, seeking as damages the difference between the "coerced" settlement
and what he reasonably might have recovered from the supplier at trial-a
classic "case-within-a-case" claim.' 22 Both sides engage lawyers well-
versed in commercial litigation as experts and, on cross-motions for
summary judgment, both experts file affidavits stating the opinions they
are prepared to present at trial.
The client's expert opines that if the jut found the fact of coercion to be true,
then the lawyer's conduct was an outrageous breach of several duties that
were owed to the client. The lawyer's expert, however, simply opines that
in his experience, settlement always requires hard talk about compromise
and the lawyer acted reasonably in his handling of the mediation.
The disconnect in the second expert's testimony is obvious: it is a
textbook example of disguised testimony about the facts. No serious
lawyer could actually believe in good faith that a lawyer who lied to his
client, threatened him, and abandoned him on the eve of trial to coerce an
inadequate settlement has acted loyally or in accord with the standard of
care in any jurisdiction. Thus, the defendant's expert must be silently
assuming that the client's version of the denouement of the mediation is
false.
That might be so, of course, but that is something that only the jury can
determine. Moreover, it is up to the advocates on both sides to present he
core facts in such a way that their own client's version is more likely to be
believed. But by leaving the proof of facts to factor out of the equation,
the defendant's expert might be subtly pushing the jury in the direction of
finding precisely those facts.12 3 And that is the evil of disguised testimony
in a nutshell-it is indistinguishable from advocacy.
The parroting of absent witnesses by experts (including lawyer-
experts)'2 4 is a form of disguised testimony because it puts before the jury
material that would not otherwise influence its fact-finding mission. It is a
relatively rare problem in general, and in legal malpractice cases in
particular, because the key witnesses-including the parties-almost
122. See Wilburn Brewer, Jr., Exper Witness Testimony in Legal Mapradice Cases, 45 S.C. L. REV.
727, 731 (1994) (categorizing the causal relationship between the breach of fiduciary duty and harm
suffered by the clients as a "case-within-a-case" concept).
123. There is an easy cure for the kind of disguised testimony involved in this example. The
expert witness for the defendant-lawyer should be asked on cross-examination to assume, one at a
time, that every fact testified by the plaintiff is true and then asked whether his opinion would
change. As a capstone, the expert should be required to confirm that he personally does not know
which facts are true.
124. See discussion supra Part I.D.
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always testify live before the jury and in detail.
But situations can arise in which a lawyer-expert will be exposed to
hundreds of documents and dozens of depositions of relatively minor
players as preparation for formulating opinions and conclusions. An
expert may rely on such material at the preparation stage, but if the
documents or minor witnesses are not actually presented at trial, the expert
should not be allowed to rely on them during actual testimony.
The same is true with respect to material that the advocate presenting
the expert discussed or described as part of preparation and
horseshedding. There is nothing improper about setting out facts that the
expert should assume and that the advocate intends to prove-indeed, that
is the preferred way to proceed, at least at the outset. But if the expert
provides opinions to the jury that are based on what the advocate intends
to prove, and the advocate is unable to orforgets to prove some of it, the expert's
testimony may and should be stricken and the client's case irretrievably
harmed.
III. SOME SOLUTIONS TO TIE PROBLEMS: THE ETHICS OF ADVOCACY
AND THE ROLE OF PROFESSIONALISM
Near the end of his contribution to Volume 5 of the St. Mary's Law
Journal on Legal Malpractice & Ethics,'2 5 Professor David Caudill sounded a
pessimistic note about the possibility of removing too confident testimony
by lawyer-experts that morphs into advocacy. He wrote:
If there is a problem with the fact that attorney-experts confidently
express contradictory conclusions in their courtroom testimony, that
problem may not be solvable-not only are they trained as advocates to take
the positions required by their client's situation, but the structure of their
analysis when they are called as an expert in legal malpractice is the same
structure as their analysis as an advocate.126
But Professor Caudill's final word was one of acquiescence. "Should we
be shocked?" he asked.127  "Or should we relax and be unsurprised that
there is gambling in a casino?"128 The real point of his Article, ultimately,
was "to identify a false alarm and silence the critics who worry that
something is wrong. "129
125. Caudill, supra note 2, at 315.
126. Id at 344.
127. Id at 345.
128. Id.
129. Id
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The point of this Article is to insist that something is seriously wrong,
but the problems the author identifies can be solved, or at least alleviated.
The problem is not that advocates present only confident-sounding experts
who support their client's position; that much is baked into the adversarial
system. Indeed, this Article takes as given that expert witnesses are not
unbiased or disinterested, and the author supports the meticulous
horseshedding of witnesses, including experts.13 o
The problems arise when advocates and their expert witnesses cross the
often blurry, but nonetheless, real lines separating ethical and professional
conduct from the unacceptable. Zealousness in service to a client's cause
is the classic mission of an advocate, but advocacy must be carried out
within the bounds of law. Or, as Robert Kutak, chairman of the
commission that proposed the first iteration of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct in 1983, once said, "[I]t may be a dog-eat-dog world,
but one dog may eat another only according to the rules.""3
The suggestions that follow are not radical, and generally require little
more than all of the key actors-advocates, lawyer-experts, and judges-
pay closer attention to professional propriety, even where the formal rules
of professional responsibility are not implicated.
A. Expert Testimony Should Never Be Permitted on Legal Motions Addressed to
the Court
Although most of this Article has discussed situations in which lawyer-
experts will give testimony at jury trials, it is worth noting that expert
testimony-usually by affidavit-is often tendered on motions addressed
to the court. This practice is unobjectionable if the motion is for summary
judgment, and the expert's testimony is Amited to a preview of what factual testimony
would be given if the case proceeded to trial This is standard practice, helping to
demonstrate the presence or absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
In most other situations, however, an expert's affidavit would be
nothing more than pure advocacy about the law and should not be
allowed. In these situations, advocates should not present expert
affidavits, lawyer-experts should refuse to provide them, and judges
should refuse to consider them.'32
130. See discussion supra Part I.E.
131. HAZARD, HODES & JARVIS, supra note 75, § 29.03, at 29-8 (quoting Robert Kutak, The
Adversay System and the Practice ofLaw, in THE GOOD LAWYER (David Luban ed. 1983)).
132. Early in his career, the author was asked to provide expert opinions (by affidavit) on a
motion to disqualify counsel because he had previously represented the opposing party in "a
substantially related matter." See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.9(a) (AM. BAR ASS'N
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B. Disguised Testimony Should Be Replaced with CandorAbout the Limitations of
Expert Testimony and Active Disclosure About Assumptions
The most pervasive (and pernicious) problem in the use of lawyer-
expert witnesses in jury trials is the easiest to cure. "Just Say No" to
disguised testimony. This does not require advocates to temper their
adversarial zeal or to short-change their clients; it simply requires them to
play by the jurisprudential rules to maintain the integrity of the judicial
system. Nor are expert witnesses, who are also lawyers, required to pull
punches. They are still on the same "team" as the advocates who engaged
them and should still strive to support the overall advocacy effort with
honest testimony, but they can and should do so without obscuring the
critical factual assumptions that must undergird their testimony.
The change in approach this Article advocates can be clearly seen in the
earlier example of a malpractice suit against the lawyer who allegedly
coerced his own client into a bad settlement at mediation."' In that case,
the expert witness for the former client was prepared to testify that in his
opinion, the former lawyer had misbehaved, but only on the stated assumption
that the client's account of the events was found by the jury to be true.
By contrast, the defendant-lawyer's expert was prepared to give the
defendant a clean bill of health without specifying what facts he was
assuming. This could mislead the jury into believing that the historical
facts were relatively unimportant, or even that the second expert was
2013) (precluding a lawyer who "formerly represented a client in a matter" from representing another
person "in the same or a substantially related matter" adverse to the initial client). Then-district court
judge David Hamilton (now a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit) ruled that
the author's "opinions" about how the term "substantially related" should be interpreted were simply
legal arguments on that issue. Accordingly, in an unpublished order, he struck the author's affidavit
but sua sponte determined to consider it as a supplemental brief. This brilliant move allowed the court
to consider the author's arguments on the merits but removed the fiction that he was anything other
than a pure advocate and also removed the conceit that any lawyer can testify under oath about the
content of the law. Several colleagues specializing in the law of lawyering have reported similar
experiences.
With judge Hamilton's example in mind, it should be clear in retrospect that he affidavit that
the author prepared in the asbestosis case in Corpus Christi, which ultimately dealt with the
applicability of the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege, should have been rejected
as improper "testimony" about the law. The author was a pure advocate in that case and should have
been required to file a brief if his views were to be heard. See discussion supra note 71 and
accompanying text.
More recently, the affidavits of Professors Andrew Perlman and Steven Gillers, whose expertise
could not possibly be questioned, were nonetheless stricken because their expert "testimony" was
actually legal advocacy. United States ex ml Fair Lab. Practices Assocs. v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc.,
No. 05 Civ. 5393(RPP), 2011 WL 1330542, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2011).
133. See supra discussion Part I.C.
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worthier of belief than the first, because only the first had qualified his
opinions. Either way, the defendant would gain a tactical advantage to
which he was not entitled.
To surrender such an unfair advantage, it would be necessary not only
for the expert and the advocate presenting his testimony to acknowledge
that he was assuming the client was over-dramatizing the events that
transpired at the mediation but also that it would be up to the jug to determine the
true stoy. With just that small adjustment, the task of convincig the jury
would be returned to the advocates on both sides, and the task of deciding,
without unfair influences, would be returned to the jury.
In the current climate, there may be some difficulty in putting this
important change into universal or even common practice. Many
advocates and lawyer-experts may fear being disadvantaged if they
abandon disguised testimony and the other side does not. It is a justifiable
fear, similar to that of being the first to engage in unilateral nuclear
disarmament.
Trial judges can be of great assistance in this project. If trial judges are
alert to the problem, they can caution counsel during final pretrial
preparations and even admonish counsel during a recess or at a sidebar
during trial. Judges can also welcome objections to the form of the
question if it appears that disguised testimony is being "teed up." And a
trial court alert to the problem can make a special effort to clarify for the
jury in final instructions exactly how expert testimony should be treated.
C. Bifurcated Trials Should Be Considered to Separate Historical Facts from
Evaluative Facts
The problem of disguised testimony could be eliminated completely if
the jury was asked to find the historical factsfirst (such as through special
interrogatories), before lawyer-experts were permitted to give their opinions
about the significance of those facts. In such a regime, there would be no
need for the experts to state their assumptions about the historical facts-
the facts would already have been set in stone by the jury, and the experts
would all be working from the same script thereafter.
The impact on a case, such as the alleged betrayal at mediation in the
earlier hypothetical, would be decisive because there is almost no gray area
between the two versions of the historical facts. If the jury heard all of the
parties and any other witnesses who might have been present at the
mediation, and determined that the betrayal was exactly as the former
client claimed, it is impossible to believe that any plausible expert witness
for the defendant would condone the behavior. By the same token, if the
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jury found that the client's expert witness was mistaken in his initial factual
assumptions-that there had been no threat and no coercion-then surely
that expert would recant his original opinions as well, because the
foundation for them would have been stripped away.
Bifurcating trials this way would be a radical departure from current
practices proceduraly, and it would be awkward or would not work at all if
the historical facts themselves included elements that a jury would not be
able to process without expert help. That aside, this innovation would not
only bejurisprudentialy sound but also would save the court and the jury a
lot of time, because much of the supposed "battle of the experts" would
evaporate in the face of a single set of facts.
IV. CONCLUSION
There is something radically wrong with the way in which lawyer-expert
witnesses are-not always, but too often-used in litigation in the United
States today. The problem is deep-seated because the relative
jurisprudential functions of judge, jury, advocate and witness have been
distorted.
When the expert witness is a lawyer, the lawyer responsible for
presenting the case will too often push the witness into disguised
testimony about the historical facts, thus usurping the jury's function, or
disguised testimony about the law, thus unseating the judge. Too often,
moreover, the lawyer-expert readily allows himself to be used in this
improper fashion.
Because the problem is largely lawyer-made, it is not surprising that the
cure must come from within the legal profession as well. The first
principle of the ethics of advocacy is that clients are entitled to maximum
zealous representation, but only within the bounds of law. Well-settled
rules of the road about the litigation process, including the law-fact
distinction, the allocation of decision-making authority between judge and
jury, and the rules of evidence, must all be counted as "law" for this
purpose.
Lawyers have an ethical duty to bring themselves back within proper
boundaries and to police each other at the same time. Judges, moreover,
have a professional duty to keep all actors in the judicial system coloring
within the lines.
Regardless of the origins of the problems discussed in this Article-
overzealousness in the adversarial culture is undoubtedly part of it-the
continuing worsening of the problem may be attributable to habit, inertia,
and lack of attention. Perhaps this Article can contribute to recognition of
220
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the need for a change in the culture.
